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Abstract
Byzantine State Machine Replication (SMR) is a long studied
topic that received increasing attention recently with the ad-
vent of blockchains as companies are trying to scale them to
hundreds of nodes. Byzantine SMRs try to increase through-
put by either reducing the latency of consensus instances
that they run sequentially or by reducing the number of
replicas that send messages to others in order to reduce the
network usage. Unfortunately, the former approach makes
use of resources in burst whereas the latter requires CPU-
intensive authentication mechanisms.
In this paper, we propose a new Byzantine SMR called
Dispel (Distributed Pipeline) that allows any node to dis-
tributively start new consensus instances whenever they
detect sufficient resources locally. We evaluate the perfor-
mance of Dispel within a single datacenter and across up
to 380 machines over 3 continents by comparing it against
four other SMRs. On 128 nodes, Dispel speeds up HotStuff,
the Byzantine fault tolerant SMR being integrated within
Facebook’s blockchain, by more than 12 times. In addition,
we also test Dispel under isolated and correlated failures
and show that the Dispel distributed design is more robust
than HotStuff. Finally, we evaluate Dispel in a cryptocur-
rency application with Bitcoin transactions and show that
this SMR is not the bottleneck.
1 Introduction
State machine replication (SMR) makes use of consensus
for totally ordering a set of commands (or proposals) that
are executed in the same order by all replicas. Consensus
protocols are generally network bound as they often rely
on some broadcast patterns to minimize the time it takes
to reach agreement on the next command. Byzantine fault
tolerant (BFT) SMRs have regained in popularity with the
introduction of blockchain technology: Facebook even aims
at deploying a variant of the HotStuff SMR [65] on at least
100 replicas over a large network [25, §5]. With the 1.6 billion
daily active users on Facebook1, comes the question of the
amount of payload needed to be treated by such a blockchain
system once it will be in production. Unfortunately, the per-
formance of SMRs generally drops significantly before reach-
ing a hundred of nodes.
One of the reasons of this limitation is commonly believed
to be the all-to-all communication pattern between repli-
cas [21, 63, 65]. In fact, n replicas sending messages to all
1https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/.
0
50
100
150
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 (M
iB
/s
)
50 100 150 200 250
Number of replica
0
100
200
300
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 (K
op
s/
s) HotStuff
Dispel
Figure 1. The goodput of SMRs (e.g., HotStuff) is low due
to its unbalanced bandwidth consumption whereas Dispel
exploits the bandwidth of more links to offer, at 128 nodes, a
12-fold speedup.
other replicas necessarily lead to Θ(n2)messages [13, 19, 20].
Given that the network bandwidth is a limited resource, it
could seem that this quadratic complexity becomes unafford-
able on large networks, like the Internet. For these reasons,
various protocols [1, 5, 8, 38, 65] replaced this all-to-all mes-
sage exchanges by one-to-all exchanges where they could.
The problem is that the evaluation of network usage is far
from being trivial and unexpected causes may impact the
observed throughput.
In this paper, we revisit this idea by offering a new SMR,
called Dispel (Distributed Pipeline) that balances its qua-
dratic number of messages onto as many routes between
distributed replicas to offer high throughput with reason-
ably low latency. Dispel follows from a year-long investiga-
tion of the application-level throughput in SMRs—commonly
referred to as goodput that accounts for payload amount.
This extensive evaluation of network performance allowed
us to identify important causes of performance limitations,
like head-of-line (HOL) blocking [53] that delays subsequent
packet delivery due to one TCP packet loss. To illustrate
the benefit of Dispel consider Figure 1 that compares its
throughput to HotStuff, the latest SMR that we are aware
of. Although HotStuff outperforms preceding SMRs thanks
to its linear message complexity, it suffers from the same
leader-based message pattern as its predecessors (cf. §5 for
the detailed setting of this figure and more results).
The key innovation of Dispel is its distributed pipeline, a
technique adapted from the centralized pipelining of micro-
architectures to the context of SMR to leverage unused re-
sources. Both pipelining techniques consist of executing
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multiple epochs (or concurrent executions) in order to pro-
vide higher throughput than what could be obtained with a
single epoch. As opposed to the classic pipelining that aims
at maximizing the usage of central resources, the distributed
pipelining maximizes the resource usage of distributed repli-
cas by allowing them to decide locally when to spawn new
consensus epochs. In particular, in Dispel each replica that
detects idle network resources at its network interface (NIC)
and sufficient available memory spawns a new consensus
instance in a dedicated pipeline epoch. This distributed detec-
tion is important to leverage links of heterogeneous capacity
like inter-datacenters vs. intra-datacenters communication
links (cf. §5.5). We draw three conclusions out of this work:
1. HOL blocking limits SMRs at high speed. Dispel
allows us to increase the performance of the SMR to
a new level, where we identified head-of-line (HOL)
blocking as the bottleneck (instead of the network in-
terface (NIC) bandwidth). This phenomenon is detailed
in §5.5 where the throughput increases at small scale
due to the multiplication of communication routes
between replicas and where performance increases
proportionally to the number of TCP connections.
2. Distributed pipelining increases robustness. Dis-
tributing the pipelining allows any replica to start a
new consensus instance by proposing requests, hence
allowing the SMR to progress despite the failure of
a single replica. This is in contrast with centralized
pipelining: the leader failure can impact the SMR per-
formance until a correct leader is selected. This is de-
tailed in §5.6 where a single failure has no noticeable
impact on Dispel and where correlated failures do
not prevent Dispel from treating 150,000 requests per
second.
3. CPU-boundplanet-scale BFT cryptocurrency.Our
experiments of Dispel within a cryptocurrency appli-
cation where miners verify all transactions (as in clas-
sic blockchains [48, 64]) show that the performance is
limited locally by the cryptographic cost at each node
and no longer globally by the network cost of BFT con-
sensus. A direct consequence is that the performance
does not drop when the system size increases, even
when deployed on up to 380 nodes distributed across
3 continents (§6).
In the remainder of the paper, we start by presenting the
background that motivates our work (§2). Then we present
the design of Dispel to pipeline the consensus executions
(§3) before we detail the implementation choices (§4). We
then evaluate Dispel within a datacenter, on geo-distributed
systems across 3 continents, against other SMRs (§5), under
correlated failures, and when running a cryptocurrency ap-
plication (§6). Finally, we discuss the related work (§7) and
conclude (§8).
2 Background
BFT state machine replication (SMR) relies on executing re-
peatedly a BFT consensus protocol designed for subsecond la-
tency. Typical implementations are sequential [5, 13, 19, 38];
they execute one consensus instance at a time. In order to
increase throughput, they batch commands (e.g., [13, 19]),
hence proposing multiple commands to the same consensus
instance. More precisely, when the system starts, n repli-
cas (or nodes) propose a batch (or proposal), possibly empty.
They execute a BFT consensus instance until they decide on
a batch. When a batch is decided, the replicas execute all
the commands of this batch and then start a new consen-
sus instance. Executing consensus instances sequentially is
instrumental in identifying and discarding conflicting com-
mands in the batch they process. This sequential design, yet
simple, is efficient enough when the consensus latency is
low.
BFT consensus instances totally order proposals at con-
secutive indices. As it is impossible to implement consensus
in an asynchronous failure-prone environment [27], various
systems assume a partially synchronous environment, in that
every message gets delivered in an unknown but bounded
amount of time [23]. In this environment, one can solve the
BFT consensus if the number f of Byzantine (or malicious)
nodes is lower than n3 [50], meaning that n − f nodes re-
main correct. Most of the practical BFT SMRs implemented
today rely on a leader-based pattern where a single node ex-
changes messages with Byzantine quorums of 2f + 1 nodes.
Recently, BFT SMR gained attention for its ability to totally
order blocks of transactions in a blockchain [48] in which the
challenge becomes to perform efficiently on larger networks.
2.1 The network bottleneck of the first phase
The leader-based pattern typically starts with a message
exchange phase where a specific node, called the leader, aims
at proposing a command to the rest of the nodes. If the
leader is faulty, the system may choose another leader. As
it is impossible to distinguish a slow network from a mute
leader in a partially synchronous environment, such changes
affect performance [6, 32, 46, 54]. If the leader is correct
and the network is timely, then the command is decided by
all nodes. But in this case, the leader may have to send its
proposal to many, making its NIC the bottleneck [33]. One
may think of batching proposals within the same consensus
instance [29], so that multiple proposals are piggybacked
in the same messages and can be decided in a row. This
increases the information conveyed to all nodes by the leader,
hence adding to the congestion.
2.2 The CPU-intensive subsequent phases
To mitigate the leader bottleneck once the proposals are con-
veyed to all nodes, the nodes typically hash the content of
the proposal into some digest [13, 19, 65] and exchange the
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resulting digests to refer to specific proposals. On the one
hand, this reduces considerably the network utilization in the
phases following the prepare phase. On the other hand, the
subsequent phases convey more frequent but smaller mes-
sages than in the first phase whose treatment consumes CPU.
The hashing function necessary to encode these messages
is also CPU intensive. As the communication is partially
synchronous it is likely that the hashing function execution
overlaps at many nodes with the reception of these message
digests, hence further increasing the CPU usage.
When requests must be cryptographically verified [13], as
in cryptocurrency applications [48, 64], or when the phases
require message authenticators [19], the system can become
CPU bound. To put things in perspective, an AWS EC2
c5.xlarge instance has an upload bandwidth of 600 MiB/s
but a CPU of this same instance can only hash 425 MiB/s
with SHA256 and verify up to 5MiB/s for 400 byte transac-
tions with the fastest ECDSA curve provided by OpenSSL as
we detail in §6. BFT SMRs typically alternate between the
network-intensive phase and these CPU-intensive phases.
2.3 Bypassing network and CPU bottlenecks
To bypass the leader completely, several deterministic leader-
less Byzantine consensus were proposed. Lamport suggests
a virtual leader election [40, 41] to transform a leader-based
Byzantine consensus algorithm into a leaderless one, how-
ever, no virtual leader election algorithm is given. Borran
and Schiper [15] proposed a Byzantine leaderless consensus
whose communication complexity is exponential.
Recently, Crain et al. [22] proposed a leaderless determin-
istic Byzantine consensus algorithm. The algorithm called
Democratic BFT (DBFT), is depicted in Algorithm 1 and
builds upon a reduction of the problem of multivalue consen-
sus to the problem of binary consensus [11] and a resilient-
optimal and time-optimal deterministic binary consensus
algorithm that was formally verified using model check-
ing [60]: Each replica of id 0 ≤ k < n − 1 reliably broadcasts
its input value such that all correct replicas deliver the same
value [16] into thekth coordinate of a local array. Later, DBFT
spawns n binary instances whose kth takes input value 1 if
the kth coordinate of the array was reliably delivered, or 0
if it was not yet delivered. The decisions of the n binary in-
stances form a bitmask that is applied to the array of values to
extract the decidable values. DBFT outputs the first of these
values to solve the classic Byzantine consensus problem, the
Red Belly Blockchain extends DBFT [61] to output all these
values hence committing more transactions, unfortunately,
it runs consensus instances sequentially.
2.4 Limits of sequential consensus instances
Once the bottleneck effects are mitigated, one can further im-
prove the throughput of SMRs by reducing the latency of one
Algorithm 1 DBFT, Consensus for Blockchains [22]
1: consensus(batch): // similar to [11]
2: reliable-broadcast(batch) // e.g., [16]
3: array[1..n] ← reliably-delivered n−t batches // wait for n−t values
4: for k = 1..n do
5: if array[k ] was reliably delivered then
6: bitmask[k ] ← fast-deterministic-binary-consensusk (1)
7: else bitmask[k ] ← fast-deterministic-binary-consensusk (0)
8: wait until bitmask is full and ∀ℓ, bitmask[ℓ] = 1 : array[ℓ] , ∅
9: return (bitmask & array) // apply the bitmask to decide a batch subset
consensus instance or by overlapping different consensus in-
stances. First, a long series of results [28, 38, 45, 55, 56, 62] re-
duce the latency of the BFT consensus, sometimes by assum-
ing correct clients [38], tolerating less Byzantine nodes [55]
or using a trusted execution environment [34, 62]. The effect
of reducing latency on increasing the throughput is quite vis-
ible [45], however, this increase is limited by the sequential
execution of these consensus instances.
Second, some form of centralized pipelining was pro-
posed [52, 65]. This technique inherited from network-
ing [49], consists of executing some consensus instance be-
fore another terminates. This approach is “centralized” be-
cause it is leader-based: a leader is needed to spawn a new
pipeline epoch. The benefit of centralized pipelining was
observed to be limited [52], again due to the network bottle-
neck at the leader (cf. §2.1). HotStuff [65] is a recent BFT SMR
that piggybacks phases of consecutive consensus instances
and Facebook is building Libra [8] on top of its variant.2
Unfortunately, it again relies on a leader. Dispel is the first
distributed pipeline SMR as described below.
3 Dispel Overview
This section presents Dispel, standing for Distributed
Pipeline, a BFT SMR for the partially synchronous model tol-
erating f < n/3 Byzantine replicas. Unlike previous SMRs,
each replica in Dispel spawns a new consensus instance
based on its available local resources.
3.1 Architecture of a pipeline epoch
Figure 2 shows the architecture and the main steps of one
pipeline epoch that runs one consensus instance. This epoch
consists of creating a batch of commands, called transactions
in the context of blockchains, exchanging batches with other
replicas and selecting an ordered subset of the batches cre-
ated by the replicas. A Dispel replica continuously listens
for client transactions and stores them in its transaction pool
(step 1). When a replica decides to spawn a new pipeline
epoch, it concatenates all the transactions in the pool to cre-
ate a batch. The replica then broadcasts the batch as the first
step of the reliable broadcast of the DBFT consensus protocol
2https://medium.com/ontologynetwork/hotstuff-the-consensus-
\protocol-behind-facebooks-librabft-a5503680b151.
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Figure 2. Architecture of Dispel. Transactions are collected
in the pool and batched (1). Replicas exchange batches
(2A,2B), store and associate them with their hash digest in
the manager (3). Replicas execute consensus protocol over
hashes (2C,3) and transmit the decisions to the manager
(4). The manager transmits the batches associated with the
decided hashes to the application (5).
(§2.3). In parallel, a dedicated hashing thread computes the
sha256 checksum of the batch (step 2A).
All Dispel replicas decide independently to spawn a new
pipeline epoch. We describe this process in details in §4.1.
As a consequence, a replica receives batches from the other
replicas in parallel to steps 1 and 2A (in step 2B). When a
hashing thread has computed the hash of a batch, it stores
the batch and its associated hash in the manager component
(step 3). The hashing thread also transmits the hash to the
consensus component. From this point on, the consensus
component sent the hash digest instead of the batch itself
when communicating with other replicas. The consensus
component exchanges hashes to complete the reliable broad-
cast and executes the subsequent steps of Algorithm 1 (step
2C). When the replicas decide a set of hashes, the consensus
component transmit the decision to the manager (step 4).
The manager then fetches the batches associated to the de-
cided hashes and gives these decided batches to the pipeline
epoch orderer that we describe in §4.5 (step 5).
3.2 Pipeline overview
Unlike traditional SMRs, Dispel leverages bandwidth, CPU
and memory resources. Traditional SMRs start a new consen-
sus instance no sooner than when the previous consensus
instance decides. Dispel uses a different approach in order
to leverage the network bandwidth and the CPU resources.
As we described in §3.1, a pipeline epoch first receives trans-
actions from clients to create a batch, then hashes this batch,
broadcasts it and finally executes a consensus over small
hash values. This results in four distinct phases depicted in
Figure 3: a network reception phase (Rx), a CPU intensive
hash phase (H), a network transmission phase (Tx) and a
wait-mostly consensus phase (C).
Rx Tx H C
Rx Tx H C
Rx Tx H C
Rx Tx H C
. . .
C0
C1
C2
C3
T0 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6
Time
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hs
Figure 3. Principle of a consensus pipeline. A pipeline epoch
consists of four phases: network reception (Rx), network
transmission (Tx), CPU intensive hash (H) and latency bound
consensus (C). As soon as an epoch finishes its first phase
(Rx), the replica spawns a new epoch. When the replica exe-
cutes four epochs concurrently, it leverages all its resources.
The goal of Dispel is to have all these phases executing
at the same time from different pipeline epochs, hence lever-
aging most resources. To this end, a Dispel replica spawns
a new pipeline epoch before the previous epoch terminates.
Figure 3 illustrates a 4-epoch pipeline where each replica of
Dispel starts a new epoch as soon as its resources permit.
Each row stands for a pipeline epoch and has four phases, Rx,
H, Tx and V. As soon as four epochs run concurrently, the
replica can execute all these distinct phases at the same time,
one phase per epoch, and leverages most resources. This
technique called pipelining is especially effective when most
of the transactions are issued by geodistributed clients to
their closest replicas and when most concurrent transactions
do not conflict because such phases consume different re-
sources. Recall that the fact that concurrent transactions are
usually not conflicting was observed before and benefited
others [38, 46].
4 Implementing the pipeline
In this section, we present how to implement a pipeline by
making sure each replica can spawn a new pipeline epoch
(§4.1), how replicas naturally coordinate to participate in the
same uniquely identified epoch (§4.2), how the algorithm
spawns new epochs (§4.3), how batches are committed (§4.4),
and how epochs are ordered (§4.5).
4.1 Distributed spawn of epochs
The first phase (Rx) of a pipeline epoch (Fig. 3) consists of
receiving transactions from clients in the transaction pool,
as we explained in §3.1. As a replica has no control over the
number of transactions that the clients send, its only respon-
sibility is to ensure that there is always space in the pool to
collect new transactions. If the pool is full, incoming client
transactions are discarded and the client must retry later
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or on another replica. This motivates the first condition to
spawn a new pipeline epoch: having a full transaction pool.
Spawning a new epoch before the pool is full would result in
fewer transactions per batch and thus in a lower throughput.
When the clients send transactions slowly, filling a transac-
tion pool takes a long time. To prevent old transactions from
hanging in the transaction pool for too long, a replica also
spawns a new pipeline epoch after a timeout expires, how-
ever, this never happens in our experiments as the demand
is high.
The next phase (Tx) consists of broadcasting an epoch
batch to the other replicas. A pipeline epoch can only
progress to its next phase if the previous epoch has finished
the same phase. A second condition for spawning a new
epoch is thus to have an idle network, at least for the send-
ing part. To detect when the network is idle, each replica of
Dispel continuously monitors its network usage. Every 2ms,
each node measures its sending rate and compares this send-
ing rate after 3 samples (over the resulting 6ms duration)
to the 600MiB/s physical network capacity (as we measure
in §5). If the network usage is lower than 5% of the physical
network bandwidth limit, then the network is considered
idle.
It is also important for a node to spawn a new pipeline
epoch only if it has enough memory available. The risk is,
otherwise, for replicas to inflate the latency of a consensus
instance by accepting to participate in too many concurrent
epochs. To decide the maximum number of epochs, each
replica divides, prior to the execution, the amount of avail-
able memory (returned by the OS command free) by the
batch size. Each replica also keeps a few megabytes to store
thread stacks, consensus instance states and other small sized
objects. This available memory is observed offline because it
is hard to assess the memory available in real-time in Java
due to the garbage collector of OpenJDK11 that is unpre-
dictable.
4.2 Following remote epochs
Each pipeline epoch corresponds to a new epoch in which
one consensus instance executes. By monitoring its own re-
source usage, a replica decides when to spawn a new pipeline
epoch independently of the other replicas. Each replica tags
the pipeline epochs it spawns with an increasing epoch num-
ber based on the current index of the pipeline—if two replicas
spawn two pipeline epochs with the same number then it
means that there are actually the same epoch. Additionally,
all the consensus messages associated with an epoch are
prefixed by the epoch number of the epoch. A replica consid-
ers that the received messages tagged with the same epoch
number belong to the same pipeline epoch and thus to the
same consensus instance. With this simple method, replicas
join an existing pipeline epoch by spawning an epoch locally
which happens to have the same epoch number.
Algorithm 2 Dispel at process pi
1: Initially:
2: batchi ← ∅ // gathers the client requests
3: stage-numi ← 0 // number of running instances
4: startedi ← ∅ ; decidedi ← ∅ // epochs of started / decided instances
5: max-stages ← available-memory/batch-capacity
6: When batchi is full, network is idle and stage-numi < max-stages:
7: spawn-instance(max(startedi ) + 1, batchi ) // non-blocking call
8: batchi ← ∅
9: When receive a message for consensusepoch and epoch < startedi :
10: wait until consensusepoch−1 decides
11: if epoch = max(startedi ) + 1 then
12: spawn-instance(epoch, batchi ) // non-blocking call
13: batchi ← ∅
14: else spawn-instance(epoch, ∅) // non-blocking call
15: spawn-instance(epoch, batch): // starts a new consensus instance
16: stage-numi ← stage-numi + 1 ; startedi ← startedi ∪ {epoch}
17: results ← consensusepoch(batch) // blocking call
18: decidedi ← decidedi ∪ {epoch}
19: if epoch > 0 then
20: wait until consensusepoch−1 decides
21: transmit results to the application
22: stage-numi ← stage-numi − 1
A replica participates to remotely spawned epochs depend-
ing on its local state and the received messages. When every
replica in the system receives an equal number of transac-
tions from the clients, the replicas end up spawning new
pipeline epochs at the same rate. In this ideal scenario, all
replicas participate to the same pipeline epochs without any
additional synchronization. When the clients load is imbal-
anced among the replicas, some replicas may never decide
to spawn a new epoch on their own. However, sufficiently
many replicas must participate in a consensus instance for
this instance to terminate. For this reason, when a replica re-
ceives a message from a pipeline epoch to which it does not
participate, if the previous epoch is decided then this replica
participates to the epoch. This restriction of having the pre-
vious epoch decided prevents a malicious node from making
other replicas participate in epochs in a distant future, which
could lead to starvation.
4.3 The algorithm for spawning new pipeline
epochs
Algorithm 2 summarizes with pseudocode how Dispel de-
cides to spawn new epochs. If a replica pi meets the three
conditions (a) the transaction pool batchi is full, (b) its net-
work is idle and (c) there is enough available memory, then
the replica spawns a new pipeline epoch (lines 6–8). The
epoch number of this new epoch is the immediately greater
integer than the epoch number of the newest pipeline epoch
to which the replica pi participated. Additionally, when a
replica receives a message from a pipeline epoch to which
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it does not participate, it waits for the previous epoch to
decide and then participates (lines 9,10). If this new epoch
is the new epoch the replica pi has spawned on its own, it
participates with the content of its transaction pool (lines 11–
13). Otherwise, it participates with an empty batch (lines 14).
This avoids submitting a batch to a consensus instance that
is likely to already have accepted n − t batches from other
replicas. In this case, the batch submitted by the replica pi
is not part of the decision set. The epoch spawning routine
(lines 15–22) starts a new consensus instance (cf. §2.3) tagged
by an epoch number and delivers the consensus decisions
in the order of the epoch numbers. We detail how a replica
orders the decision inside a epoch in §4.4 and across epochs
in §4.5.
4.4 Intra-epoch ordering between hashes and
batches
An interesting side effect of our pipeline is that correct repli-
cas may decide upon the hash of batches before receiving
the corresponding batches in full. As we mentioned in §3.1,
because replicas decide locally to spawn a new epoch, the
transactions reception and the batches exchange happen con-
currently. Additionally, as the consensus decides on hashes
and not on batches, the consensus decision also happens
concurrently with the batch exchange. As a result of this
concurrency, a replica sometimes decides on batches it has
not yet received. Indeed, as we described in §2.3, the DBFT
consensus algorithm starts by a reliable broadcast and then
executes a binary consensus on every reliably delivered value.
During the first step of a reliable broadcast, a Dispel correct
replica sends the batch to all the replicas.
The two following steps of a reliable broadcast are all-to-all
broadcasts used to prevent correct replicas from delivering
values broadcast by Byzantine to only a subset of the replicas
or from delivering different values. Dispel correct replicas
only send hashes during these to all-to-all broadcasts in order
to save bandwidth. A reliable broadcast delivers its value
when the replica delivers enough messages from the two all-
to-all reliable broadcast. As a result, a Dispel correct replica
sometimes has the hash of a batch reliably delivered without
knowing the corresponding batch. This is not an issue since
this is only possible if at least one correct replica knows the
batch. A replica handles this corner case by broadcasting a
batch request for the decided hashes with an unknown batch
at the end of each pipeline epoch. When a replica knows
all the decided batches, it sorts them with their hash as a
sorting key.
4.5 Inter-epoch ordering to guarantee starvation
freedom
Having each pipeline epoch deciding an ordered set of
batches is not sufficient. Because of the concurrency between
pipeline epochs, the order in which epochs are decided is
not always the order in which they are spawned. Replicas
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Figure 4. The consensus reordering pipeline of Dispel in-
dicates a possible evolution of pipeline epochs (C0 to C2) as
events occur. The character in the middle of each cell indi-
cates the epoch state, either running (R), decided (D), ready
for commit (C) or not yet started (/). The top left charac-
ters indicate the received batches A, B or C. The bottom left
characters indicate the batches the decided hashes stand for.
solve this issue by transmitting the pipeline epochs decisions
sorted by the epoch number of these epochs. More formally,
a replica transmits the decision of a pipeline epoch with the
epoch number k to the application only after transmitting
the decisions of the previous pipeline epochs for all j < k
to the application. This corresponds to the lines 19–21 in
Algorithm 2.
Figure 4 illustrates how both intra and inter-epoch or-
derings take place. It shows the evolution of three pipeline
epochs on a replica when this replica receives messages.
Initially (T0), only two epochs C0 and C1 are running. The
replica has received the batch A for C0 and the batches A,
B and C for C1. Upon reception of the batch B for C2 from
another replica (T1), the receiving replica spawns locally the
new pipeline epoch C2 as described in lines 9–13 of Algo-
rithm 2. Upon reception of the consensus messages for C0
(T2), the replica reaches consensus and decides on the batches
A and B. However, as we explain in §4.4, the replica has not
received the decided batch B. Upon reception of this batch,
the epoch C0 is marked as decided but not yet ready to com-
mit (i.e., to transmit the decision to the application). The
replica then receives consensus messages for C1 (T3) and
decides on the batches A, B and C. Since the replica knows
the decided hashes, it is ready to commit C1 but waits for
the previous epoch C0 before transmitting to the applica-
tion. Finally, the replica receives the batch B for C0 (T4). The
replica then commits both epochsC0 and C1 and mark them
as terminated.
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To conclude, we summarize three properties for the dis-
tributed pipelining that allows to proceed efficiently:
1. Early epoch: this requires launching a epochk+1 early,
typically epoch k + 1 should start before the epoch
k completed in order to guarantee that the pipeline
translates into higher throughput.
2. Oldest epoch priority: epoch k always has priority
over epoch k + 1 to ensure that the number of concur-
rently active epochs eventually decreases, preventing
undesirable situations like starvation.
3. Pipeline feeding: the SMR must guarantee that com-
mands are enqueued into the upcoming epochs to guar-
antee progress, despite the workload induced by the
inter replicas communications.
Guaranteeing these three properties help ensure the good
performance of the distributed pipelining.
5 SMR Evaluation
This section presents an evaluation of Dispel in geo-
distributed setups with up to 256 machines. We compare
the performance of Dispel against four SMRs protocols from
the literature. The larger experiments with a cryptocurrency
application are deferred to §6.
5.1 SMRs protocols
For this evaluation, we implement Dispel, a leaderless SMR
using the DBFT consensus described in §2 and the pipelined
architecture described in §3 and §4. Dispel is written in Java
using only the standard Java libraries. We compare Dispel
against four SMRs:
• BFT-SMaRt: is a leader-based BFT SMR similar to PBFT
with further optimizations that has been maintained
in Java for more than a decade [13]. It was used for the
ordering service of Hyperledger Fabric [3] to tolerate
Byzantine failures [58]. We used the branch weat2
of the official BFT-SMaRt git repo https://github.com/
bft-smart/library that outperforms the master branch
when geo-distributed [12, 57].
• EPaxos: is a leaderless crash fault tolerant (CFT)
SMR [46] that does not provide the guarantees of a
BFT SMR but that serves as a fast baseline. It is an im-
proved version of Paxos with no leader and a fast path
for non conflicting commands. We use the Go author’s
library from https://github.com/efficient/epaxos.git.
• HotStuff: is a recent leader-based BFT SMR. It out-
performs BFT-SMaRt by having the leader piggyback-
ing phases of distinct consensus instances into the
same messages [65]. Facebook is currently developing
in Rust the Libra state machine [8] on a variant of
HotStuff [25]. We use the C++ authors’ library from
https://github.com/hot-stuff/libhotstuff.
• Zyzzyva: is a leader-based BFT SMR designed to re-
duce decisions latency [38]. To this end, Zyzzyva repli-
cas reply optimistically to the client before reaching
consensus and let the client solve disagreements. We
use the Zlight C++ implementation [5] that we patched
to make it run on a geo-distributed setup. More pre-
cisely, the original implementation uses IP multicast
and UDP communication without any mechanism to
handle packet loss. We replace the UDP implementa-
tion by a standard event-driven loop TCP implemen-
tation.
Other SMRs: there is a long body of BFT SMRs papers, how-
ever, not all implementations are available: we contacted
the authors of BFT-Mencius [45] and ezBFT [4], two lead-
erless BFT protocols, but there were no readily available
implementation.
5.2 Benchmark setup
This evaluation takes place on AWS EC2 instances. We use
c5.xlarge instances for running replica and client processes.
Each instance is a KVM virtual machine with four hardware
threads implemented by two hyperthreaded Intel Xeon core
running at 3 GHz, with 8 GiB of memory and a network
interface of 600 MiB/s upload and download speed. Each
virtual machine is running a Ubuntu 18.04 distribution with
an AWS modified Linux kernel 4.15, OpenJRE 11 and the
glibc 2.27. The SMRs are compiled using OpenJDK 11, gcc
7.5 and go 1.10.4.
We ran BFT-SMaRt, Zyzzyva, HotStuff and EPaxos in their
default configurations indicated in their original papers or
reports [5, 13, 46, 65]. Each Dispel replica uses a batch size
of 25/n MB where n is the number of replica. We configure
Dispel replicas to use up to 12 pipeline epochs. In every ex-
periment, we execute one replica process per VM. In addition,
we dedicate two VMs per region to execute the client pro-
cesses. For EPaxos, BFT-SMaRt, HotStuff and Dispel, each
client VM executes a single client process which sends many
parallel transactions to the replicas. Zyzzyva clients only
implement blocking requests. For Zyzzyva, we execute 100
client processes per client VM. We found that this number
of client process is sufficient to saturate Zyzzyva replicas.
The goal of the following experiments is to compare the
throughput that each SMR delivers. This throughput in-
creases with the client load. As a tradeoff, increasing the
client load generally results in a higher latency. To provide a
fair comparison, we choose to explore different client loads
for every data points we plot. We then select the client loads
resulting in a throughput of at least 90% of the best observed
throughput. Among these selected loads, we pick the one re-
sulting in the best latency. The intuition behind this method-
ology is that when the client load increases, the latency
remains stable until an inflection point and then skyrockets.
The throughput increases until this inflection point and then
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Frankfurt Ireland London Paris
Frankfurt – 60 109 179
Ireland 25 – 148 80
London 14 10 – 210
Paris 8 19 7 –
Table 1. Latency in ms (bottom left) and bandwidth in MiB/s
(top right) between the AWS Europeans datacenters.
remains stable. Our methodogy identifies the inflection point
by selecting the set of client loads with the best throughputs
and then pick the latency obtained in this set right before
the inflection point. All the data points are the average over
at least 5 runs.
5.3 Pipelining copes with round-trip delays
As we expect the pipeline to increase throughput despite
high latency, we start by comparing the throughput and la-
tency ofDispel to EPaxos, HotStuff, BFT-SMaRt and Zyzzyva
within a single continent. More precisely, we measured the
throughput and latency on up to 256 VMs located in Europe
(Ireland, London, Paris and Frankfurt). Table 1 summarizes
the latencies and bandwidth between the four datacenters,
mesured with nuTCP.
Figure 5(a) depicts the throughput of Dispel, EPaxos, Hot-
Stuff and Zyzzyva. We found that BFT-SMaRt and HotStuff
exhibit the same behavior although BFT-SMaRt throughput
is consistently at least 2× lower than HotStuff throughput.
We choose to not plot BFT-SMaRt for sake of clarity. First, we
observe that Zyzzyva does not perform as well as the others
with a throughput of 25 Kops/s at 4 nodes and of 2 Kops/s or
below with 64 nodes or more. This is because Zyzzyva is op-
timized to perform in a local area network (LAN): it does not
batch requests and executes sequentiallySecond, as expected,
EPaxos outperforms HotStuff by delivering a throughput
up to 7× larger at 32 nodes and still 3× larger at 256 nodes.
EPaxos does not offer the same level of fault tolerance than
HotStuff: it does not tolerate Byzantine failures while Hot-
Stuff does. Third, all solutions perform significantly slower
than Dispel due to their lack of pipeline. Dispel exhibits the
best performance at 4 nodes with a throughput of 462 Kops/s
(more than 2× larger than EPaxos and 13× larger than Hot-
Stuff). At worst, with 256 nodes, Dispel has a throughput
of 73 Kops/s (still 2× larger than EPaxos and 6× larger than
HotStuff).
Pipelining typically hides the increase in latency through
parallelization, executing multiple consensus instances at a
time. Although HotStuff pipelines to some extent, its pipeline
only piggybacks phases of consecutive consensus instances
into the same messages and does not leverage resources from
any replicas like Dispel’s pipeline does. Interestingly, Dis-
pel also doubles the performance of EPaxos at 4, 128 and
256 nodes even though EPaxos does not tolerate Byzantine
failures. As we consider only non-conflicting requests here,
all command leaders of EPaxos should commit their com-
mand in parallel—similarly to a pipeline. The difference is
that EPaxos does not spawn new leader proposal based on
resources as Dispel does, hence unable to detect resource
contention.
A surprising phenomenon is the unexpected high through-
put ofDispelwith 4 replicas and the througput drop between
4 and 16 replicas. As we describe later in §5.5, we expect the
throughput ofDispel to increase with the number of replicas
while the number of replica is small, then to decrease. This
is what we observe from 16 replicas, however the through-
put of Dispel at 4 replicas is 1.68× larger than at 16 nodes.
Although we do not have a definitive explanation for this
throughput, we are confident that it does not come from ei-
ther our measurement nor the methodology we use. Indeed,
over the 5 runs we use to compute the average throughput
of this point, the individual throughputs are all between 449
Kops/s and 499 Kops/s. The client load we use is the one that
results in the best throughput over the explored values. Our
main hypothesis is that for this small number of replica, all
the replicas progress at the same rate in the pipeline, which is
the ideal scenario that we describe in §4.2 where all replicas
always participate with full batches.
5.4 Higher performance than SMR for blockchains
Figure 5(b) depicts the latencies obtained for the four SMRs,
Dispel, EPaxos, HotStuff and Zyzzyva, in the same settings
as above (§5.3). This shows that Dispel does not offer the
best latency. This is because the pipeline does not need to
reduce the latency to increase throughput. Zyzzyva, designed
for LANs, offers consistently the lowest latency by staying
below 300 ms until 64 nodes and always below 1700 ms.
In contrast with other solutions, the latency of HotStuff
improves with the system size at small scale, which is likely
due to our measurements that extract the best throughput
runs of all runs before selecting the best latency run within
these values (§5.2). Due to HotStuff lower communication
complexity, HotStuff latency increases slower than other
SMRs. As a result, the best throughput values are observed
in conditions where all latencies are relatively similar. Given
that Facebook aims at deploying a variant of HotStuff on
100 nodes and more as part of their Libra blockchain [25,
§5], it is particularly interesting to compare performance at
128 nodes: the latencies of HotStuff and Dispel are in the
same order of magnitude, respectively 1300 ms and 2100
ms, whereas the throughput of Dispel (Fig. 5(a)) is more
than 12× higher than HotStuff. We realized that the default
HotStuff is limited so in §6 we tune HotStuff to obtained
better performance on geodistributed experiments, however,
as we will see, it remains significantly slower than Dispel.
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Figure 5. Performance of Dispel, HotStuff, EPaxos and Zyzzyva depending on the number of nodes spread in 4 European
datacenters (Ireland, London, Paris and Frankfurt) with an increasing number of nodes committing 400-bytes transactions.
Throughput (MiB/s)
Parallel streams Total Per stream
1 4 4.53
10 45 4.53
50 225 4.51
100 443 4.43
200 533 2.67
Table 2. Bandwidth between two machines located in Syd-
ney and São Paulo depending on the number of parallel TCP
streams obtained by nutTCP and showing that HOL blocking
limits performance.
5.5 Multiplying TCP bandwidth capacity
Because TCP preserves ordering, using one connection to
transmit independent data often leads to the head-of-line
(HOL) blocking suboptimal phenomenon [53] where the loss
of one packet actually delays the reception of potentially
numerous subsequent packets until after the packet is re-
transmitted and successfully delivered. As simple way to
circumvent this phenomenon is to use several TCP connec-
tions in parallel. Table 2 illustrates the difference between
the NIC physical limit and the bandwidth limit of a single
TCP connection. As one can see, the network usage increases
linearly with the number of parallel connections until the
limit of the network interface is met at around 533MB/s,
after which the bandwidth per stream decreases due to this
physical limit.
Despite having several open TCP connections, one per
peer, sequential SMRs replicas are unable to benefit from this
parallelism. Indeed, when such sequential replicas broadcast
a message, they must wait the transmission of this message
completes on all the TCP connections before to progress. On
the contrary, Dispel replicas do not wait the transmission
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Figure 6. Effect of HOL blocking on the throughput of
Dispel and EPaxos with an increasing number of nodes
committing 128-bytes transactions for a TCP-bandwidth of
23MiB/s between North California and North Virginia, and
of 11MiB/s between North Virginia and Tokyo.
completion of every TCP connection thanks to their pipeline
structure.
To illustrate how Dispel cirumvents the HOL blocking
phenomenon, we measure the throughput of EPaxos, Hot-
Stuff, Zyzzyva and Dispelwhen the number of replica varies
on two setups. The first setup evenly spreads the replicas
across two regions, North Virginia and North California.
The bandwidth of one TCP connection between these two
regions if 23MiB/s. The second setup evenly spreads the repli-
cas across North Virginia and Tokyo. The TCP bandwidth
between these two regions 11MiB/s. On these two setups
where the TCP bandwidth is low, Dispel benefits from an
increasing number of replicas. However, when the number of
replicas becomes too large, the probability of having a packet
loss on a majority of TCP connections becomes significant
and Dispel does not benefit from additional replicas.
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We report on Figure 6 the throughput for Dispel and
EPaxos on the two setups, 11MiB/s and 23MiB/s of TCP
bandwidth, when the number of replica increases with trans-
actions of 128 bytes. We do not report the throughput for
HotStuff, BFT-SMaRt and Zyzzyva as their throughput is
systematically below respectively 20 Kops/s, 14 Kops/s and 6
Kops/s. We observe that for each setup and every number of
replica, the throughput of Dispel is larger than for the other
SMRs. Moreover, the throughput of Dispel first increases up
to 108MiB/s at 6 replicas in the 23MiB/s bandwidth setup
and up to 85MiB/s at 10 replicas in the 11MiB/s bandwidth
setup. This increase is caused by Dispel replicas using more
TCP connections in parallel when the number of replicas
increases. We observe a similar yet less pronounced evolu-
tion for EPaxos. Indeed, EPaxos replicas decide transactions
in parallel as long as they are non conflicting. This paral-
lelism makes EPaxos also using TCP connections in parallel
although to a lesser extent. While we do not observe this
phenomenon on HotStuff, BFT-SMaRt and Zyzzyva, their
throughput is too small to conclude.
5.6 Robustness in case of failures
In order to assess the performance of Dispel and HotStuff
under failures, we ran an experiment for 122 seconds on
n = 32 nodes spread evenly in Ireland, London, Paris and
Frankfurt during which we manually injected crash failures.
In this experiment, each transaction is of size 400 bytes,
similar to the size of simple Bitcoin transactions.
Boosting HotStuff performance for geo-distribution. As
we observed in §5.4, HotStuff performance is particularly
limited by default. As far as we know, HotStuff has only
been evaluated in a single datacenter where the “geodis-
tributed” experiments were emulated by adding artificial
latencies [2]. As we show in §5.5, real geodistributed setups,
where large blockchains are expected to be deployed, also
suffer from packet loss forcing TCP connections to block
during packet retransmissions. As an example, during the
Red Belly Blockchain experiments [61], the bandwidth of
a TCP connection between the AWS availability zones of
Sydney and São Paulo was only 5MB/s. To cope with this lim-
itation, we increased the size of the batches used by HotStuff
to obtain the same decision size of 25MB in both HotStuff
and Dispel in large-scale experiments. When HotStuff uses
larger batches, there are proportionally more packet loss dur-
ing the batch transmission than during the other phases of
consensus. Since a replica broadcasts batches to every peers
in parallel, larger batches brings more opportunities for par-
allel TCP transmissions. While this increases the throughput,
it comes at the cost or larger latencies. In our case, using
25MB batches results in an average request latency of 20
seconds.
Impact of isolated and correlated failures. Figure 7 de-
picts the performance expressed as the throughput in
MiB/second and the number of transactions committed per
second by the two protocols. First, one can see that HotStuff
takes more time than Dispel to reach its peak throughput
that is lower than Dispel. These two observations confirm
previous conclusions that the leader-based pattern leads to
higher latency and lower throughput [61].
More interestingly, we manually injected a failure of the
leader on HotStuff and the weak coordinator of the binary
consensus on Dispel. As HotStuff triggers a view-change
when the faulty leader is detected as slow, the system must
wait for the detection to occur and for the view-change to
complete before the throughput can increase again. Again
this phenomenon was already experienced in leader-based
SMRs, like Zookeeper [54, Fig.6], Multi-Paxos [46, Fig.10],
Mir-BFT [59, Fig.8] and Paxos [24, Fig.8]. More surprisingly,
a second view-change seems to occur systematically after
one failure, this can be seen at 57 seconds. As no single
node correctness is required for termination in Dispel, the
throughput does not seem to drop in Dispel after a single
failure.
We also injected correlated failures to see the performance
variations in Dispel and HotStuff. The correlated failures
consists of shutting down all the remaining machines of
the Frankfurt region. The throughput of HotStuff drops to 0
whereas the throughput of Dispel drops by about 30%. Note
that the impact of failures on performance of leader-based
SMRs raises the question of their suitability for cryptocur-
rency applications where simply DDoS-ing one node, the
leader, or a region can DDoS the entire system.
6 Cryptocurrency Application
We now present the performance of Dispel within a cryp-
tocurrency application on up to 380 machines deployed over
3 continents and show that the bottleneck is not Dispel but
the cryptographic verifications.
Application cryptographic overhead. To understand if an
SMR can be used for blockchain applications like a cryptocur-
rency where assets are transferred among owners of some
accounts represented with a public key, one must evaluate
the performance of the SMR when transactions are crypto-
graphically signed by the clients and these signatures are
verified by the replica. Figure 8 depicts the time it takes to
verify signatures with one core using the public-key cryp-
tosystems available in OpenSSL and written in C, and in
Bouncy Castle and written in Java. One can observe the
large variation of performance of the cryptosystems and the
overhead of the Java library.
Dispel with a cryptocurrency application. We extended
Dispel to support a cryptocurrency application by signing
and verifying all transactions. Each user is equipped with
an account and a public-private key pair. Each client pre-
generates signed transactions using its private key prior to
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Figure 8. Verification per second on one core for various
elliptic curves. Note the logarithmic scale on the y-axis.
sending them to some replica, whereas every correct replica
that receives a transaction verifies it using the public key
associated with the account. Once the verification is correct
the transaction can be stored.
From blockchain to block-sequence. Note that the hash-
link between blocks is not necessary under the assumption
that f < n3 processes can fail as one can simply retrieve
an immutable copy of a block by requesting it from 2f + 1
correct processes. By definition, among these responses, all
correct replicas will respond with the same tamper-proof
copy. Hence one has to find the copy duplicated f + 1 times
among the 2f + 1 ones to identify it as the correct copy of
the block.
Performance at large-scale. For this experiment, we used
up to 380 c5.2xlarge replica VMs located equally in 10 re-
gions on 3 continents: California, Canada, Frankfurt, Ireland,
London, North Virginia, Ohio, Oregon, Sydney and Tokyo.
The c5.2xlarge VMs have the same configuration than the
c5.xlarge VMs we use in §5 but with 8 hardware threads
instead of 4 and 16 GiB of memory instead of 8 GiB. For
sending transactions, we spawned 10 additional client VMs,
one from each region. We selected the per-node batch size
to be 2MB for 10 replicas, 8MB for 40 replicas and 24MB for
120, 250, 380 replicas to minimize the duration of the experi-
ments. We use the secp256k1 public-key cryptosystem that
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Figure 9. Performance of a cryptocurrency running on top
of Dispel as the system size increases from 10 to 380 nodes
equally balanced across 10 datacenters over 3 continents.
is used by Bitcoin [48] and transactions of size 400 bytes,
just like Bitcoin UTXO transactions.
Figure 9 depicts the performance of Dispel when execut-
ing a cryptocurrency application where all transactions are
verified by all replicas. We represent the transactions com-
mitted per second, including the signatures in addition to
the application payload that contains the simple transfer
information. One can see that the throughput and latency
vary slightly across the different network sizes but there is
no clear difference between the performance on 10 nodes
or 380 nodes, indicating that Dispel is not the bottleneck
when running the cryptocurrency application. In these ex-
periments, only 3 epochs in Dispel is sufficient to achieve
the best performance in the cryptocurrency application, so
further cryptographic optimizations like verification shard-
ing [59, 61] would better leverage Dispel.
7 Related Work
Research on Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) started in the
80’s [42, 50] and later improvements [19] led to a long series
of leader-based BFT systems. The technique of pipelining
originated in network [49] andwas later applied to consensus
in the context of crash fault tolerance [39].
Bypassing the leader bottleneck. The idea that the leader-
based design can limit the throughput of consensus is not
new [7, 14, 15, 59, 61]. S-Paxos is a variant of Paxos that aims
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at disseminating client requests to all replicas to offload the
leader [14]. In particular, it increases the throughput of Paxos
by balancing the CPU workload over all replicas, similar to
what our hashing phase does in Dispel. However, it tolerates
only crash failures. RBFT [7] uses multiple concurrent in-
stances of PBFT to detect a slow master instance and triggers
a leader replacement through PBFT’s complex view change.
Mir-BFT [59] combines these instances to outperform PBFT
but when some leaders fail, the throughput can only recover
after multiple view changes discard the faulty leaders. Some
consensus algorithms alleviate the need for a leader by re-
quiring an exponential information gathering tree [15] or
synchrony [30]. Democratic BFT does not use a leader but a
weak coordinator whose failure does not prevent termina-
tion within the same round [61]. Despite this observation,
most blockchain SMRs build upon the classic leader-based
pattern [18, 26, 31, 35, 36].
EPaxos [46] bypasses the leader whose failure might im-
pact performance by exploiting one leader per command
issued. If these commands do not conflict, they are commit-
ted concurrently. Atlas [24] improves over EPaxos on 13 sites
distributed world-wide by adding replicas closer to clients.
These solutions are not Byzantine fault tolerant. Classic re-
ductions [10] from the multivalue consensus to the binary
consensus problem, like the one we use, avoid the leader
to propose the value that will be decided. Instead they reli-
ably broadcast values and spawn binary consensus instances,
which has already proved efficient in SMRs [44, 61]. Honey-
Badger [44] is an SMR for asynchronous networks building
upon this reduction. It exploits erasure coding to limit the
communication complexity of the reliable broadcast. As con-
sensus cannot be solved in an asynchronous model [27], it
builds upon a randomized consensus [47] that converges in
constant expected time as long as messages are scheduled
in a fair manner [47, 60], an assumption called fair sched-
uler [17]. Red Belly Blockchain [61] is deterministic, works
in a partially synchronous model [23] and outperforms Hon-
eyBadger by avoiding the CPU overhead of erasure coding
and introducing verification sharding. Although it relies on
DBFT [22] like we do to balance the load across multiple
links, it does not leverage the bandwidth like Dispel be-
cause it does not pipeline: consensus instances are executed
sequentially as each block depends on the previous one.
Pipelining to increase performance. The idea of pipelin-
ing is quite old and consists, in the context of networking,
of sending a packet before its predecessor has been acknowl-
edged within the same connection [49]. The original version
of Paxos [39] mentioned the idea of pipelining as ballotting
could take place in parallel with ballots initiated by different
legislators. Pipelining ballots in Paxos has also been imple-
mented [37, 51, 52], however, the benefit of pipelining was
not significant. JPaxos [37] is an implementation of Mul-
tiPaxos that focuses on recovery, batching, pipelining and
concurrency, but the pipeline is actually tuned in a separate
work [51, 52] where the leader of MultiPaxos can spawn
multiple instances in parallel to increase the resource utiliza-
tion. The authors note that the drawback of the approach is
that pipelining may lead to congestion: multiple instances
can max out the leader’s CPU or cause network congestion.
Distributed pipelining leads to different conclusions.
Chain [5] organizes nodes in a different pipeline so that
only one head node, that can be seen as a leader, spawns
all instances. HotStuff [65] is a leader-based SMR with a re-
duced communication complexity. Its leader piggybacks the
phase of one consensus instance with the phase of another
consensus instance, hence offering a form of pipelining. In
addition it reduces the leader bottleneck by having clients
sending their proposals directly to all replicas so that the
leader can simply send digests in all the consensus phases. To
reduce message complexity, HotStuff makes use of threshold
signatures. Dispel differs in that it does not reduce message
complexity but instead balances its network load by having
any replica spawn new consensus instances based on its
resource usage.
The COP scheme [9] dispatches batches to concurrent
consensus instances to execute pipeline stages in parallel
at every replica by exploiting the multiple cores available.
Dispel distributed the pipeline over the network, minimizing
the number of threads per replica in an even-driven loop that
favors run-to-completion. Multiple threads are only spawned
for cryptographic tasks including the hashing task.
Mencius [43] is an SMR that exploits pipelining by al-
lowing replicas that are faster than the leader to propose a
no-op proposals, hence allowing to speed up the consensus
by (i) preventing replicas with nothing to propose from block-
ing the protocol and (ii) coping with faulty leaders. The au-
thors mentioned the difficulty of making Mencius Byzantine
fault tolerant because not all communications are exchanged
through a quorum and would require a trusted component.
Some efforts were devoted to reducing the latency of repli-
cated state machines to increase their throughput without
the need for pipelining [28, 45, 56]. BFT-Mencius [45] con-
sists of upper-bounding the latency of updates initiated by
correct processes by using an abortable timely announced
broadcast. Like in Mencius, BFT-Mencius allows a replica
to skip its turn by proposing no-op. The experimental re-
sults clearly indicates in a cluster setting that the lower the
latency the higher the throughput for BFT-Mencius as well
as Spinning and PBFT [19]. This confirms previous observa-
tions on non-pipelined replicated state machines [28]. Some
research work even explored the latency optimality of BFT
state machine replication [56], which was implemened in
BFT-SMaRt [13]. Our approach indicates that distributed
pipelining can lead to significantly higher throughput while
still achieving reasonable latency at large scale.
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8 Conclusion
Dispel is the first SMR to exploit resources through dis-
tributed pipelining. At 128 nodes, it improves the throughput
of the HotStuff SMRwe know by 12-fold. Within a cryptocur-
rency application, Dispel demonstrates that blockchains can
suffer from bottlenecks that are not related to the network
usage of the consensus protocols they build upon. Our work
has revealed the significant impact of the HOL blocking
factor on performance, that was neglected because it could
not be observed in slower SMRs before. This observation
opens up new interesting research directions on the choice
of layer-4 network protocols for large-scale applications like
blockchains.
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